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Abstract

China is quickly becoming a world power and will soon reach parity with the United States.
China has gotten far more aggressive in its expansion, which extends to the islands within the
South China Sea. China claims most of this based on the Nine-Dash Line, in violation of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. As the current world superpower, the United
States must respond to these claims given the geostrategic importance of the region. An analysis
of the current Chinese and US positions, as well as those of the other littoral states with
competing claims, allows for the determination of US strategy for the future. These claims are so
strongly held due to the economic potential of the area, but as they stand, no one can fully benefit
from it. An extensive literature review was conducted to determine where the situation currently
stands and what the US should do about it. Fostering a cooperative relationship between these
nations and preventing armed conflict are the US goals in the area. This can be accomplished
through using force as a deterrent for conflict and working to develop diplomatic resolutions to
the various border disputes, especially between the ASEAN nations and China.
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Maritime Moves: The American Response to the South China Sea Conflict
The South China Sea is a hotly contested area that holds the key to the future of the
nations that surround it. Three trillion dollars’ worth of commerce passes through these waters,
making its control both strategically and financially important.1 The control over sea lanes is the
means to a trade advantage and a massive boost to the economies of the nations that surround
this body of water. There are six main counties that are involved in the dispute: China, Vietnam,
Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and the Philippines, although there are few others with much smaller
or already resolved claims as well. These nations all seek to control as much of the region as
possible, as doing so would mean a larger piece of the prosperity pie. Part of the way this control
is measured and enforced is through the possession of small islands within the South China, and
thus is desired by these littoral nations. These claims overlap or are inconsistently enforced,
however, leading to political and occasionally military disputes. Because of the vitality of the
region, the United States should work to foster peace in the region, both through enforcement of
previous treaty agreements but also in helping negotiate settlements that allow for the fair use of
resources by all nations, with joint control playing a role in the settlements reached. This solution
is very complex and will vary in implementation based on the willingness of the involved nations
to cooperate, but if done peacefully, will allow for a great peace to be achieved in the region.
Resources Worth Fighting Over
To understand why this is needed, the current situation and motivation of the involved
parties must be discussed. The unrest in the South China Sea is due to the vast amounts of raw
materials available to the nations that control them, in addition to the trade routes crossing over
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the ocean that contains them. There are two major and several minor resources that are available
to whoever controls the South China Sea. The region has a massive fishing industry (12% of the
world’s total fish catch) and oil reserves (7.7 billion proven barrels and up to 213 billion
projected barrels), along with substantial natural gas reserves and rare earth minerals deposits.2
This mineral and energy wealth makes the area even more tantalizing than if the islands were
simply located within a barren expanse of water over which ships crossed. This has led to the
tensions in the region, as nations are willing to fight to better themselves. These territorial
disputes and flare-ups are not new in the South China Sea region, as conflict has been ongoing
since the mid-twentieth century, but there are guidelines being set in place by international
institutions to help solve these issues. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) states that ownership any habitable island gives control to at least 12 (the Territorial
Sea) and up to 200 nautical miles (the Exclusive Economic Zone) around that island, but many
nations claim and inhabit the same island groups and have failed to develop a governing body
able to coordinate the fishing, environmental protection, security, and other needs in the area.3
The lack of an effective multilateral remedy and the persistence of the overlapping claims make
it clear that something must be done to resolve this issue effectively and permanently, but what?
A Complicated American Position
This of course leads to the question of why the United States should get involved at all, as
these disputes are over an area half the world away. Considering the vital economic and strategic
value of the region to the nations within it, there is potential for conflict in an area where much
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of the United States’ trade passes through. More pressing is the United States mutual defense
treaty with the Philippines that was signed in 1953 and is still in force today, meaning that if it
becomes involved in a military engagement, the United States is required to come to its aid.4
This is relevant because China’s increasing aggression in the area makes a confrontation more
likely. Given that the United States would not like to become involved in another war now that
its commitments in the Middle East are winding down and tensions in Eastern Europe are
ramping up, the United States must take steps to fulfill its obligation to the Philippines by
ensuring fair dealings with the surrounding nations and avoiding a military confrontation.
Areas of Tension
The Philippines is not the only reason why the United States is involved in the South
China Sea either. Since it does not have undisputed control of the claimed areas of its EEZ,
Vietnam is welcoming to any other navies to counter the influence of China, including that of the
United States.5 This United States involvement is not seen as beneficial by all parties involved,
however. China considers the United States to be an instigator in the South China Sea and seeks
to limit American involvement to bolster its security status in the region and prevent them from
collaborating with the Philippines and Vietnam at the expense of Chinese claims.6 This is due to
the legacy of colonialism and humiliation China has experienced, making it more aggressive in
counteracting what it sees as aggressive colonial powers.7 This means that the United States
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could potentially go to war with China in the region, which America seeks to avoid. China also
sees avoiding war over the South China Sea as its best interest, as if a war were to take place the
United States would side against them and in favor of their regional competitors, so it attempts to
walk the fine line between assertive and incendiary in promoting its interests and avoiding the ire
of America.8 This does not mean that China has not acted in a way that the United States could
perceive as hostile. China has worked to counter American efforts to survey the South China
Sea, upbraiding previous agreements and the freedom of navigation.9 Of course, Beijing justifies
these actions as responses to hostilities initiated on the part of the United States and seeks to
maintain influences over its corner of the world, which is not an unreasonable position. Still, this
mentality means that bargaining over the area could be difficult, but not impossible. The United
States can think creatively to work on both achieving its strategic goals while also not alienating
China. For instance, the Trans-Pacific Partnership strengthens economic ties between America
and 11 countries in East and Southeast Asia but does not include China, meaning that its
inclusion could be used as a bargaining chip in negotiations regarding the South China Sea.10
Such creative maneuvering could be the key to moving forward and achieving prosperity in the
region.
Trade Disputes
The issue of finance is partly why the South China Sea is so important to the nations
surrounding it. The dispute must also be resolved before the largest economic benefits can be
seen. Most companies will not extract resources like oil in actively disputed areas, meaning that
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as the dispute goes on, no country will be able to fully benefit from the resources it claims to
possess, so resolution is needed to simply make use of the claimed territory.11 This monetary
situation becomes more complicated once the financial relationships between the ASEAN states
and China is considered. China is the second-largest trading partner of the Philippines, narrowly
behind Japan, with few barriers to prevent economic integration between the nations, as well as a
major partner to the other littoral states as well.12 Such figures show the complicated relationship
between those countries and make the island disputes more important, and given the reliance on
foreign investment and trade, the maintenance of claims to the South China Sea begin to make
significantly more sense. The trade boost of controlling the sea lanes would allow these to help
themselves without as much of a need of foreign investment. The energy resources under portion
of the ocean would also allow for both the profit from their sale and the savings on fuel costs not
importing would provide, giving rebuild national economies after pandemic in a world where
resources, especially fuel, is becoming increasingly costly.
Piracy Enforcement
Trade has also played a part in how the conflicts over the islands have and will continue
to pan out, as its use is a possible tool for both sides to leverage, although the balance favors
China. The dispute over the South China Sea is more than just about the ownership of resources
and the ability to extract them and boost the trading and financial positions of the surrounding
nations, but directly affects the trade itself. The complex and disputed borders make enforcing
piracy law difficult, as it cannot be enforced internationally, and the littoral states cannot enforce
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it since they are unable to determine who owns what portion of the sea.13 Piracy is an economic
“bad” that no side desires in the region but is more likely to exist when no one has proper control
over a large portion of the ocean. Piracy can be combated through military force, but this is
hardly an easy task, with militarization possibly leading to conflict.
Escalatory Consequences
No one member of the South China Sea area wants armed conflict, even if at times they
act aggressively, as the region is becoming increasingly connected economically, meaning that a
war or other breakdown in relations would negatively affect the financial situation of any nation
involved, with or without new territory.14 Just because conflict avoidance is in the best interest of
the surrounding nations does not mean that is what always occurs, however. Threats of military
responses over reefs and outcrops are not simply rhetoric, as military action in the area has
occurred previously. During and after the 2012 Scarborough Shoal incident (when Chinese
military vessels evicted the Filipino Navy from the contested area in response to the removal of
several Chinese fishing boats), China stopped accepting Filipino fruit imports, crippling an
industry that provided 200,000 jobs, with 30% of that industry’s trade conducted with China.15
This shows the negative impact on trade that even small-scale conflict between China and a
littoral state can have, let alone a full-scale war. Now that the resources and the stakes have been
described, the major players in the region will now be discussed.
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ASEAN
ASEAN is the cooperative body that comprises many of the nations involved in the South
China Sea dispute (with the notable exceptions of China and Taiwan), which has meant that it is
the principal actor in negotiations between these nations and the larger power. ASEAN and its
component nations have had a growing dialogue with China over security measures, with 10
agreements signed between China and at least one ASEAN nation in the period between 1999
and 2012 alone.16 Such dialogue could mean that ASEAN can collectively solve the issue
without little American involvement. There are other signs of promise in the communications
between the two entities as well. ASEAN and China have a growing relationship, especially
economically, but the South China Sea remains a sticking point that, if removed, could lead to
better relations overall and better economic prospects and productivity within ASEAN.17
Economic interconnectedness means that the system will be more stable in the long term, as
conflict will damage these connections and the prosperity they bring.
Cooperative Success
ASEAN itself is an excellent model of how this type of conflict resolution works. East
Asia has been relatively peaceful and has had very few battlefield deaths after 1980, especially
among ASEAN nations, who avoid interfering with others and respect their sovereignty.18
Because the ASEAN nations work together to solve disputes among themselves and prevent
conflict, they will be best suited to solve the border disputes between their own member nations,
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with several treaties in place that have already done so. Other ASEAN members, which are not a
part of the main six South China Sea competitors also host claims to parts of the South China
Sea, such as Cambodia and Thailand, but these claims are generally previously resolved or
relatively minor, as in the case of Indonesia’s claims that overlap with China, Malaysia, and
Brunei.19 These nations, while not major players, should not be ignored, as they also play a role
in the situation and could make multilateral negotiations more difficult. Bilateral agreements
should be considered when they will be more effective at bringing a conclusive settlement.
China’s growing alienation from its neighbors means it could be willing to make territorial
concessions in exchange for better relations, especially because the willingness of countries like
Vietnam to involve other powers in resolving the dispute instead of the bilateral negotiations
China wants.20 This tactic could be used in conjunction with ASEAN negotiations, as the
piecemeal set of bilateral agreements would mean that there would be less to agree upon in a
multilateral treaty. The lack of consensus within ASEAN is its primary weakness, as it attempts
to connect various countries with wildly different economies, religious beliefs, and systems of
government to get them to come to the same conclusions. Therefore, ASEAN is an important
aspect of the South China Sea dispute, but it is not sufficient to resolving it, as the individual
littoral states have their own interests and compete with one another in addition to China. Thus,
these nations with the largest claims must be examined to determine what the situation is and
how the United States can help in this situation, respecting the sovereignty of the nations
involved and mediating the conflict without inflaming it due to its presence.

19

Ian Storey and Zhengyi Lin, The South China Sea Dispute, 22.

20

Ibid., 192.

SOUTH CHINA SEA POLICY

12

The Philippines
The first individual player and the one with the closest connection to the United States is
the Philippines. The Philippines professes ownership of the nearby area of the South China Sea
based on both a historical and geographical factors, as it claims discovery of several islands there
in 1947, the incorporation of those islands into the Palawan province in 1978, and, most
importantly, the inclusion of the area within its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone based on the
UNCLOS.21 These discoveries and claims are not simply exploratory in nature either, as the
military has gotten involved as well. The Philippines have had a presence in the Spratly Islands
since 1956, occupying the area then and reinforcing them with a military presence in 1971.22 It
also has proximity on its side. It is already much nearer to its portion of the contested Spratly
Islands than China is, which serves as a key element of support for its position on who should
control the area, along with the other factors of discovery and previous occupation of the area.
These reasons make the current Filipino claim to the South China Sea justifiable in the sense that
it is not claiming new territory, but territory that it has had previously held jurisdiction over,
leading to a claim based upon international law and historical tradition. This international law
point is especially powerful because the Philippines has taken China to arbitration with the UN
regarding the area and won.
Filipino Problems
Unfortunately, the Philippines is currently hard-pressed domestically. It has been
economically devastated by the pandemic and has a very weak military in comparison to its
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neighbors.23 It also suffers from internal stability problems such as terrorist attacks. Not only
have issues in domestic politics altered the Philippines’ ability to respond to threats by its focus
on the army and preventing domestic terrorism over naval protection, but they have also affected
its cooperation with the United States. The Filipino government has acted in a way contrary to its
values and constitution and so it has received criticism and action from the American
government, leading to worsening relations and pro-China maneuvering at the start of the
Duterte administration (2016-2018), although this split has reversed somewhat as China grew
increasingly unpopular among the Filipino people.24 The US-Filipino relationship is vital to both
sides. Downturns in it have negative repercussions that affect not just the Philippines, but the rest
of the region. Given that the United States has a closer partnership with the Philippines than any
other nation in the region, it has the most impact on them, as the American rebalance in the area
has led to a continued emphasis on the diplomatic and military relationship between the United
States and the Philippines. This action is also needed on account of the Philippines’ weakness
and China’s strength. It is also required to because of the mutual defense treaty between the two
nations.25 The aid America gives to the Philippines must be substantial enough to counteract the
deficit between them and their stronger neighbors, and it must be given in a way that does not
alienate them from either China or the rest of ASEAN.

Stratfor, “U.S., Philippines: Working-Level Talks Begin on Visiting Forces Agreement,” Stratfor
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23
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Vietnam
Vietnam is the largest player in the South China Sea besides China, with both nations
claiming full ownership of both the Spratly and Paracel Islands (in practice, China controls the
Paracels and Vietnam has the largest share of the Spratlies).26 Its large role in the region means
that its actions have major ramifications going into the future and that the United States should
take care not to alienate itself from it. Thankfully, Vietnam has been open to the support of other
nations, even America despite their troubled history.27 This is because of China’s incredible
unpopularity in Vietnam, with Chinese actions leading to domestic Vietnamese demonstrations
against China and talks between the governments.28 Such poor relations have opened the door to
the United States in serving as a balancer between the two nations.
Contention With China
The domestic Vietnamese perception is based on a laundry list of issues it has with
China. This has made the Vietnamese-Chine relationship contentious. Such issues include
Chinese attempts to ban fishing and prevented oil drilling within Vietnam’s EEZ, sending its
naval ships into the contested waters, and occasionally harassing and threatening the fishermen
that attempt to travel or work in the disputed areas.29 Since fishing is part of people’s basic
livelihood and is generally allowed to continue even during times of war, the vitriolic response to
these such actions is justified. This has led to a Vietnamese response to China’s perceived
aggression. In retaliation for China’s actions (including the conducting of naval exercises in
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contested waters), Vietnam held live-fire exercises near the area as well as a show of force.30
Such actions, while logical in asserting itself against an unfriendly neighbor, could lead to more
conflict, which would destabilize the region and prevent the growth that both sides desire, so
diplomatic steps must be taken to avoid escalation and instead focus on coordination.
Cooperation With China
Luckily, such plans are already in progress. China and Vietnam have been working on
creating a joint development plan for the South China Sea.31 This plan could help smooth out
their relationship, but negotiations between the two nations will be challenging for both sides.
The centralized nature of the communist parties controlling both Vietnam and China makes
compromise difficult, as any sort of compromise would be seen as weakness on the part of the
government taking a smaller share of the original claim, as the EEZs allow for the controlling
government to restrict military travel in their territory.32 This says nothing of the shared
grievances that makes an amicable agreement difficult, so the United States should do its best to
help resolve some of these problems while promoting peace and allowing for both sides to
benefit and use the resources at hand to survive, promoting flexibility and compromise to allow
such an agreement to function properly.
Taiwan
If survival is the main goal of any nation involved in the dispute, it is Taiwan.
Considering Taiwan is de facto independent but generally unrecognized as a nation, as well as
constantly under threat from China, it has probably the least amount of bargaining room of the
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contesting nations. That does not mean that it acts from a position of weakness. On the contrary,
the government of China (both the mainland and Taiwan) is willing to fight for every piece of
territory they claim and have repeatedly refused to make concessions or give up historic claims,
making negotiations between them and other nations much more challenging.33
Divisive Unity
This is common mindset could also lead to common ground, especially if the
governments of both parties become more cooperative rather than coercive. This is due to the
similarities between the nations, as they share a common history but not a common government.
The reasoning behind the claim itself is even shared by both nations. The Nine-Dash Line, which
was officially claimed by China, was established in 1947, before either the nationalists or
communists had control of the county, and as such the claim is stated by both mainland China
and Taiwan.34 This of course is problematic because Taiwan also inherits all of the problems
China does with its claims overlapping the boundaries of other nations, only magnified by the
fact that it wholly overlaps the PRC’s claim. Given this, the claims themselves are also a point of
contention, even within Taiwan itself. Taiwan’s claims to the area have thus remained vague, in
part because it is split between two opposing parties that do not want to alienate the other section
of the electorate, with one emphasizing a strong claim and the other desiring to claim less or
none of it, with differing interpretations of international law factoring into the split.35 However,
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this whole situation could come with unexpected benefits. If Taiwan and the PRC can come to an
agreement in the South China Sea, it could help bolster their relations in other areas as well.36
Possible Cooperation
Despite some of the more hardline rhetoric, Taiwan is willing to compromise, at least
unofficially, because of the moderation needed by the two main parties. Despite Taiwan’s
sweeping claims, its unrecognized status and relatively precarious position have precluded it
from acting forcefully, so it has generally made lip service to defense of the area but has
remained peaceful.37 This has led to it working with rather than against the nations it has
competing claims with. Taiwan may work more with ASEAN nations in support of their South
China Sea claims when China is actively posing a security threat towards Taiwan at the time,
making China shift its focus from proximate Taiwan to further afield.38 Since continued
existence rather than the South China Sea is the priority for Taiwan, it means that it is more
willing to bargain to better those chances, meaning it is less likely to cause major conflict in the
area.
Malaysia and Brunei
Malaysia and Brunei are the two other major ASEAN players in the South China Sea
conflict, although their claims are much less contentious due to their distance from mainland
China, even if they still fall under the Nine Dash Line. Given Brunei’s small size, it is not the
most important player in the conflict but does have conflicting borders with several of its
neighbors. Its claims are relatively clear-cut thanks to its small coastline but still overlap with
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those of other nations. It does not suffer from the issue of fragmentation or decline nearly as
much as Malaysia does. Malaysia has had declining natural gas production in recent years,
making the hydrocarbons available in the South China Sea a high priority to restoring export
capabilities, but it also desires to control the sovereignty to remain territorially unified.39 To do
so, Malaysia has undertaken diplomatic measures to solve these issues, as China has commenced
talks with Malaysia to bilaterally solve their border dispute.40 These talk, while imperfect, have
made serious progress in solving the overlapping claims between the two nations. Such talks
have also occurred between other nations in the area as well. Malaysia has worked out most of its
outstanding disputes, especially a lingering overlap with Brunei, but still has some issues with
China despite their recent talks.41 This cooperation is beneficial, as well as the reason why this
area is lower in importance in the conflict, as it is a small portion of the disputed territory that
has a reasonable hope of being resolved through negotiations soon.
American Actions
Now that the nations with a major dispute with China have been discussed, American
activity in the area must now be covered. The American rebalance towards Asia during the
Obama administration was met with support from the ASEAN nations, as negotiations increased,
and nuclear submarines were sent to the area as a sign of strong and continued commitment.42
This has continued under the Trump administration, which took a hardline stance against China
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globally, leading to more interest in the South China Sea. This political continuity was picked up
by the Biden administration as well. The United States has continued to make signs of strength in
the South China Sea region under the Biden administration as a “steady movement” of ships has
continued into the area.43 The US naval force in Southeast Asia, frequently deployed in the South
China Sea, is the 7th Fleet, which comprises 50 to 70 vessels at any time, ranging from aircraft
carriers to submarines to guided missile cruisers.44 Such numbers are needed to counter China’s
growing strength, in addition to other operations in the area, like anti-piracy efforts in the Strait
of Malacca. Even though there is much to do in a region containing a significant amount of the
world population, the continued support of its allies is crucial to the United States. That is why
there is always at least one part of the US military operating in the South China Sea region at a
given time, with this deployment based on coordination with allies in the area.45\
Freedom of Navigation
A key aspect of American intervention in the South China Sea relates specifically to
China’s chronic issue of closing off various parts of the waterway. This is because a primary US
goal in Southeast Asia is the maintenance of open sea lanes.46 The United States takes significant
measures to ensure this goal is fulfilled, as doing so allows for global trade to prosper and all
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parties to have a fair ability to act regarding shipping and commerce. The United States has
constraints on what it can do in the region, however. American naval movements in the region
have been conducted with respect to international law, allowing for the protection of the freedom
of navigation, conducted under the innocent passage section of UNCLOS through the territorial
waters.47 These constraints mean that the United States cannot act unilaterally or as freely as
China does, as it must abide by the very rules they are trying to enforce and protect.
A Delicate Balance
In addition to complying with international law, the United States has its own internal
issues hampering South China Sea action. US defense expenditure is projected to continue
falling, as China is projected to continue growing, albeit at a slower pace than its prior breakneck
speed, meaning that the United States will no longer have guaranteed global dominance and will
thus need to act more strategically to stay ahead.48 It must be willing and able to act boldly in the
face of adversity, not backing down to China in situations where it has the upper hand. The
United States must also be careful in its actions, though, as boldness must not be recklessness.
America should act to protect its and its allies’ interests without unduly antagonizing the major
regional power that is China, especially if an armed conflict broke out. Should the United States
intervene in a conflict there, it would drastically change its relationship with China and escalate
the situation, but if it did nothing, it would lose considerable credibility with its allies.49
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China
China is the key to the South China Sea dispute, as it dominates even the very name of
the contested ocean area. Since it claims so much of the Sea with its Nine-Dash Line, how it acts
and reacts will be pivotal in the fate of the area. This Nine-Dash Line claim to the South China
Sea covers nearly 80% of the territory of that area and was established in 1947.50 This claim has
been pressed and reinforced through building bases on the various island groups in the area. But
it has not just taken to claiming the islands. China has conducted land expansion projects and
built military bases on many of the islands it claims. These Chinese bases constructed on the
contested islands serve not only to bolster China’s claims to the area but also provide valuable
signals data, satellite communications, and serve as platforms for missiles that allow them to
better defend their claims.51
Chinese Strategy
What it will do on territory it has previously patrolled but not occupied will be the
clearest indicator of its intentions, and how the United States responds to that will reveal its
resolve to protect the areas, as it will be forced to decide whether that land is worth furthering
aggression or not.52 This was incorporated into the strategy used back in Beijing. Xi Jinping’s
strategy has been “hiding capabilities and biding time”, allowing for China to act when it most
favorable while avoiding as much common opposition as possible.53 This strategy is logical and
difficult for the United States to react to, as it inherently means that China will act when the
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opposition is at its weakest or when China is at its strongest, making its activities, if not hard to
predict in nature, difficult to counter due to the carefully chosen circumstances.
Chinese Possessions
The issue of sovereignty also plays a role in the dispute, with the PRC using it to its best
advantage. Parts of the contested territories have already been claimed as legitimate by the
Beijing government, which would make US action in the area bad press, as China would claim
the United States has violated its sovereignty. These claimed areas are then patrolled by naval
vessels, which are deployed for a variety of reasons. China has sent numerous groups of
warships into the region, with value as both firepower and propaganda back on the home front.54
Such deployments within the 9-Dash line are bold shows of force that declare China’s perceived
justified defense of the territories it legitimately owns. Thus, part of the discussion must relate to
the reasons why China believes it has rightful possession of the South China Sea.
Raison d’etre
China bases its claim to the area within the Nine-Dash Line based on its two thousand
years of fishing in the region and a desire to restore China to its rightful place after its degrading
treatment by the colonial powers of Europe and Japan.55 Since it wants to reverse the humiliation
it unfairly experienced, it does so through the aggressive territorial expansion that it was
formerly on the receiving end of. As such, it uses both the military and government to
accomplish this and claim the islands have interacted with but not owned for many years. This
has not been well-received by its neighbors, however. China’s assertiveness has produced a
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negative response from the nations bordering it, as they have become more aggressive and have
begun modernizing their navies and other military capabilities to protect what they claim is their
rightful sea rights, in contrast to the 9-Dash line that China claims as its own right.56
Aggressive Enforcement
Despite the clear issues with them, China has continued to press its claims to the islands
it calls its own, to the point of establishing a prefecture of its major island of Hainan to also
include the Spratly and Paracel Island groups.57 This gives the claims some legitimacy as the
contested islands are considered by Beijing to be just another part of the land of China rather
than disputed territory, as well as strengthens the rhetoric of a violation of sovereignty if they are
interfered with. This sovereignty comes at the expense of the territory of other nations, which it
has continually acted with aggression towards. China has sent hundreds of boats into the area
defined by the UN as the Philippines’ EEZ, with Filipino maritime patrols have been ramping up
in response to China’s continued activity in the Scarborough Shoal, showcasing the increasing
tensions between the nations that has only increased recently.58 All this aggressive action has a
touch of irony as well. China’s official policy in the South China Sea is peaceful resolution
through negotiations.59 Despite this, much of the activities it has conducted have been far from
peaceful as it does all it can to achieve these goals.
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Chinese Objectives
There is one main reason why the Chinese government goes so far to secure its claims. It
is more than a simple land-grab or a push for resources; China desires control of the South China
Sea to further its goals of becoming the predominant global superpower, as well as a buffer from
any possible future hostilities.60 Military force does not serve as the only strategy used by China
either, but it is an integral part of it. China has worked to both charm and use force against
ASEAN members to maintain good standing, avoiding large-scale conflict while also advancing
its hold in the region.61 This allows China to better its position while also getting the territory it
sees as necessary to defend itself and power its future. Thus, the South China Sea is the means to
an end rather than an end itself, and the Chinese government is willing to use military force to
ensure that its goals are achieved, as shown by its warships frequenting contested waters.62
Unconventional Warfare
Not all the current expansion has been conducted through solely military means either, as
the Chinese government has used civilian vessels to extend its influence as well. Fishing boats
that serve as its militia have been congregating at Whitsun Reef, part of the contested Spratly
Islands group claimed in part by the Philippines, Vietnam, and other nations.63 These militia
forces again bring up the issues of compliance and escalation. Militia forces are more
challenging to control, meaning that their deployment by China and Vietnam could have
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unintended consequences.64 China’s liberal use of them could further escalate the situation, even
as they provide the temporary benefit of extra available forces that allow it to have a greater
force there than it would otherwise.
Inspections
Militia forces are not the only unconventional way that the Chinese government has
capitalized on the situation. China’s coast guard was recently authorized to inspect any vessels,
even to the point of using force against foreign ships, operating within China’s jurisdiction that,
based on its Nine-Dash Line, covers nearly the entire South China Sea.65 Such inspections and
searches can be conducted only because China already has a good strategic position in the area.
Ships and bases situated within the South China Sea allow for continuous Chinese surveillance
of the region, allowing it to counter threats to its position there.66 The ability of China to enforce
the controversial inspection law may seem strategically advantageous to China, but it comes with
negative side-effects It has already inflamed tensions among the surrounding nations and if this
law, as the ambiguous nature of the declaration allows for government discretion in doing so, is
acted upon, means that the already high tensions would increase even more.67 Such actions could
lead to a unified regional front against China as the surrounding littoral states have yet another
reason to work together to maintain their own commercial interests and sovereignty.
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Economic Competition
Paramilitary forces and inspections are not the only way China seeks to gain power in the
region either. Other nonmilitary means are far more subtle and may prove popular among the
nations China is seeking to gain influence in. These include economic practices designed to
boost regional support for itself, as well as helping to defuse the increasing tensions between
China and its neighbors. For example, China has pledged $10 trillion in aid to Southeast Asia,
which has continued even after the pandemic hit, thus highly integrating itself into the economies
of Southeast Asia, which makes a stand against China is made more difficult, especially with the
United States increasing its hardline rhetoric.68 Such a dichotomy forces the ASEAN nations to
choose between a distant ally and a close neighbor, with the fear that siding with one will
alienate the other. This strategic move allows China to act much more freely than it would
otherwise, as the economic integration distracts from the predation on disputed territory. Once it
is taken and the Chinese government’s influence is firmly established, China will be much freer
to act according to its own desires, able to cut off aid to smaller nations at will if its demands are
not met, making it a dangerous threat to national sovereignty in the area, which must be matched
by another group or else China will become the unopposed regional hegemon, continuously
expanding as a way to gaining power and prestige.
Pandemic Impact
Because of this potential future, China is not alone in expanding its presence in the area,
as the United States, has worked to counter it. America, along with China, has continually
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increased its activity in the region over the past several years, with the growth not abating even
during the pandemic.69 The pandemic has not only not slowed down the force build-up in the
area, but has made it more complicated as well. This has of course been used by each side to gain
the upper hand. For example, China took advantage of a weakened relative US position when 2
of its aircraft carriers were temporarily diverted due to COVID-19.70 Additionally, the response
to the pandemic has been politicized by China for its own gain. It has been much more willing to
share its vaccines with nations like the Philippines, unlike the United States which has generally
kept them for its own citizens.71 This has given China more political leverage while portraying
America as selfish and unwilling to help. Future aid and other COVID-related support to other
nations by the United States should thus be handled with greater care to avoid that sort of
embarrassment and strategic setback, demonstrating American morality through its actions rather
than through mere messaging.
Conflict Resolution
This leads to how the United States should act against China and what course it should
advise its allies and potential partners in the area. Both the United States and China have tried to
spin the media narrative in their own favor to get the smaller nations to side with them, framing
the other side as acting as a bully and trying to force their own interests in the international
political sphere and in the South China Sea.72 This idea of interests is an important one, as the
United States is not a colonial power seeking to dominate and control Southeast Asia but instead
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wants to promote its own goals in the area, those being the protection of national sovereignty and
democratic rights of individuals, which benefits those nations. America does not have a selfish,
personal strategic interest in protecting the disputed islands claimed by the littoral states of the
South China Sea, so it should be careful in its actions to prevent Chinese aggression while also
avoiding entanglement into needless conflict.73 This means that while a solution may involve the
military, it should be as a deterrent rather than an offensive tool, as acting aggressively could
lead to further Chinese aggression and possibly war. The United States should keep force its
forces in the area but only as a deterrent for use if the situation deteriorates. It should instead
focus on using diplomatic and economic means to counter aggression, allowing both sides to get
something positive for themselves and thus for all to benefit.
Brokering Compromise
One way the United States could help the ASEAN nations and China could solve their
disagreement over the Spratlies, Paracels, and other contested islands would be through
brokering an agreement that would allow both sides to gain the territory without losing prestige.
A possible compromise between the two nations is that of a Joint Development Agreement
between the groups. Such an agreement would sidestep the conflict over sovereignty over the
area, would allow the smaller nations to develop further from its shores and thus diversify from
its main source of drilling, which is rapidly depleting, and allow for China to get access to some
resources in a limited fashion as to not antagonize it through total denial.74 The main goal of the
United States would be to make such an agreement without leading to further resentment,
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making a future conflict worse. Conflict due to resource denial has historic precedent in the
region, namely that of the US oil embargo to Japan prior to World War II leading to their
eventual declaration of war. Since the dispute is over resources rather than territory occupied by
people, the comparison to appeasement with Germany, which would logically spring up from
such a compromise, would thus be avoided, as well as any military conflict between China and
the ASEAN states, which would necessitate American involvement based on its military alliance.
This is based on the knowledge that China is unlikely to bargain or go back on its statements
regarding the contested islands like the Spratlies.
A Hard Bargain
It is widely understood that China is unlikely to fully relinquish its claims to the South
China Sea, despite the legal obligation for it to do so.75 Thus, the United States should use that
knowledge as it goes forward and makes the best possible policy. This policy is necessary not
only to promote US interest, but to preserve that of other nations from the desired dominance of
China. Because China has continued to act aggressively against weaker, sovereign states in the
South China Sea, American involvement becomes important as not only a way to help preserve
the rights of those nations but also to deter China from taking actions that could increase
international instability, conflict, or war.76 This means the United States would both be helping
other nations maintain their influence and distinctness, but also prevents a war that could be
devastating for the entire world, not just the regional powers involved. This requires a long-term
approach, not a single quick fix. Small gains and agreements can be made to foster a sense of
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cooperation and trust rather than the current antagonistic relationship, building over time to allow
for both sides to make some concessions in the area in exchange for peace, especially because
peace benefits both sides.
Fostering Arrangements
The United States should work with China to achieve their stated policy of peaceful
negotiations and help steer them away from aggressive actions. Additionally, working to initiate
or arbitrate bilateral agreements between the bordering nations could help resolve the matter
piecewise but peacefully, as bilateral agreements allow for both sides to be heard as well as the
final arrangement to be much more specific than a multilateral treaty that vows for peace and
stating important values but puts little concrete action into achieving these objectives. Bilateral
agreements could also mean an arrangement between ASEAN as a whole and China, as the
organization could allow for a collective bargaining tool that allows for more leverage against
the larger China. The United States should also encourage ASEAN to solve the border issues
within its own nations, preferably before they undergo negotiations with China, as ASEAN’s
track record of peaceful negotiations will help inspire confidence in the negotiations among its
member nations and allow for smoother and quicker talks.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the South China Sea dispute remains a complicated issue that attracts the
attention of both local and international powers. Its strategic location and resources make its
possession desirable to any aspiring nation and create a source of conflict when these claims
overlap, and nations compete with one another. The Philippines and Taiwan serve the role of key
US allies that the United States has an obligation to support while avoiding escalating the
conflict. Vietnam is also proving to be, if not a friend, at least a nation that shares a common

SOUTH CHINA SEA POLICY

31

interest to the United States, as its weaker position in relation to China necessitates aid from
more powerful nations while encouraging it to choose a side in a lose-lose situation. The United
States also stands to lose much, either in support of allies or in an international conflict, so it
must act in a way that allows for neither possibility to occur. China stands to gain much, and so
has proven its interest by continually pressing its advantage through forceful action in the area.
The United States must thus work to deescalate the increasing military and paramilitary activity
in the area by promoting diplomatic solutions and compromise. This would be especially
effective within ASEAN, as the structure for dialogue and cooperation is already in place and the
US could serve more as a moderator than anything else, given their long and continued
cooperation together. China serves as the bigger issue, but by encouraging both sides to come to
a compromise agreement, including the use of Joint Development Agreements the more complex
and messy areas of overlapping claims. The United States should not be aggressive, but firm,
using force as a deterrence and allowing other nations to do the same, preventing it from being
used. Allowing for compromises with its own policy, such as China’s admittance into the TransPacific Partnership, in exchanges for concessions on the other side would help prove the good
faith of the involved parties as well. The negotiation of a peaceful solution would allow for a
more productive global economy and a more peaceful region, a benefit to not only American
interests but also that of China and the ASEAN nations, as well as a potent symbol of the power
of diplomacy and democracy in an increasingly harsh and polarized world.
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